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For more than twenty years, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
has conducted full comparative hearings in every li-
cense renewal case in which an incumbent seeking
renewal of a license has been challenged by a mutu-
ally exclusive applicant proposing a new facility.'
Even after a licensee has constructed a broadcast or
common carrier facility and has operated it in the
public interest over the license term, the Commission
still holds a full comparative hearing to weigh the
renewal application against the mere paper proposal
of the challenger.2 Enormous private and public re-
sources have been spent on these comparative cases.3
* Mr. Tollin is a member of the firm Wilkinson, Barker,
Knauer & Quinn, Washington, D.C. His practice concentrates
in telecommunications and litigation. The firm is active in the
telecommunications, international communications, and broad-
cast areas. Mr. Tollin previously worked in the Office of Gen-
eral Counsel/Litigation Division at the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.
** Mr. Kirk is an associate with Wilkinson, Barker, Knauer
& Quinn, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1988, Merrimack College;
J.D., 1991, The National Law Center, George Washington
University.
I If it is determined that a licensee has provided meritorious
service and there are no serious deficiencies in its operating rec-
ord, the licensee is awarded a "renewal expectancy." This re-
newal expectancy is then considered as one of the primary fac-
tors in a comparative hearing to determine whether the
incumbent licensee or the challenger should be awarded the li-
cense. The renewal expectancy is not dispositive, however. See,
e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775 (1978); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447
F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), opinion clarified, 463 F.2d 822
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
' Title III of the Communications Act grants the FCC au-
thority to issue licenses of a limited duration to broadcasters and
common carriers (e.g., cellular telephone service, paging, etc.)
using the radio spectrum. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (1988).
' As one broadcast licensee noted: The "cost of fighting re-
newal challenges for Miami and Jacksonville [broadcast] stations
was enormous ... [Licensee's] staff was required to review
14,000 pages of records to compile information for one interro-
gatory alone out of 299." Formulation of Policies and Rules Re-
Yet, challengers virtually never win on a compara-
tive basis once the Commission awards the incum-
bent a license renewal expectancy because the FCC
places more emphasis on a proven operating record
than a mere paper proposal.4 Because the Commis-
sion's objective is to predict who will best serve the
public interest in the coming license term, this "re-
newal expectancy" policy makes perfect sense. 5
In 1983, the Commission granted the first of hun-
dreds of licenses to provide Domestic Public Cellular
Radio Telecommunications Service ("Cellular") on a
common carrier basis to the public.' The licenses
were granted for ten-year terms, with the renewal
lating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Report and Order, 4
FCC Rcd. 4780, 4795 n.46 (1989). The FCC has recently gone
to great lengths to conserve resources in the hearing process. See,
e.g., Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 7 FCC
Rcd. 2664 (1992). In the cellular field, section 22.916 of the
rules was adopted to expedite the hearings by making them
largely paper proceedings. 47 Fed. Reg. 10036 (1982) as
amended at 47 Fed. Reg. 11710 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 50699
(1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 26822 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 23648 (1984);
51 Fed. Reg. 26897 (1986); 56 Fed. Reg. 58509 (1991). How-
ever, this attempt to truncate the hearing process has not met
with much success. In the top thirty cellular markets, it took an
average of 752 days from the filing of an application until a con-
struction permit was awarded. In the recent La Star case, it took
over two years from release of the Hearing Designation Order
until release of a Commission order. See In re La Star Cellular
Telephone Company, Decision, 7 FCC Rcd. 3762 (1992).
4 See Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d
74 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[W]e have too long hungered for just one
instance in which the FCC properly denied an incumbent's re-
newal expectancy"). Occasionally, however, basic qualifying is-
sues do get raised against an incumbent during the renewal
hearing which lead to its disqualification. See RKO General,
Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 231-33 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing
issue of candor), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
5 See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37,
43 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983).
6 See Chicago SMSA Ltd. Partnership, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 538 (1983). A cellular system
is defined as:
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process beginning in 1993. Between October 1, 1993
and 1996, approximately 259 of these cellular li-
censes will expire.' In an effort to establish stan-
dards for the renewal of these cellular licenses, the
Commission released a Report and Order' requiring
a comparative hearing whenever a competing appli-
cant filed an application for the license being re-
newed.9 Consistent with its practice in the mass
media service, the FCC decided that it might not be
lawful to adopt a bifurcated renewal procedure for
cellular licenses based on section 309 of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 ("Act"),"0 as interpreted in
Citizens Communications Center v. FCC."
The "bifurcation" concept rejected by the Com-
mission was as follows: assuming a challenger filed a
competing application in the first phase of the re-
newal process, the Commission would initially deter-
mine whether the incumbent licensee should be re-
newed based on its operating record; second, if the
incumbent was found to have served the public inter-
est, the renewal application would be granted a dis-
A high capacity land mobile system in which assigned
spectrum is divided into discrete channels which are as-
signed in groups to geographic cells covering a cellular ge-
ographic service area. The discrete channels are capable of
being reused in different cells within the service area.
47 C.F.R. § 22.2 (1991). For additional definitions for cellular
service, see Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's
Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, Report and
Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981), modified, 89 F.C.C.2d 58
(1982), further modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982), appeal dis-
missed sub. nom. United States v. FCC, Docket No. 82-1526
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1983).
' See In re Revision of Part 22 of the Commission's Rules
Governing the Public Mobile Services, Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 7 FCC Rcd. 3658 n.3 (1992).
' In re Amendment of Part 22 of the Commission's Rules
Relating to License Renewals in the Domestic Public Cellular
Radio Telecommunications Service, Report and Order, 7 FCC
Rcd. 719 (1992).
Id. at 719, para. 1.
10 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1988). See Report and Order, 7 FCC
Rcd. 719, para. 35 (1992).
" 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), opinion clarified, 463
F.2d 822, (D.C. Cir. 1972).
12 Preferably, if a challenger filed a competing application, it
would only be considered tendered and not accepted for filing.
Thereafter, the renewal applicant's past performance would be
considered. If found deserving, a finding would be made (pursu-
ant to 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)) that the public interest would be
served by the grant of the renewal application. Thereafter, the
renewal challenger's application would be dismissed because
there would be no open frequency. If no public interest finding
was made, however, then the challenger's application would be
accepted for filing, and both applications would then be declared
mutually exclusive and designated for a full comparative hear-
ing. In the alternative, at the expiration of the license term, both
renewal applications and license challenge applications would be
positive renewal expectancy and the proceeding
would be terminated. A full comparative hearing be-
tween the renewal applicant and the challenger
would commence only if the incumbent's license was
not renewed in the first phase.12
The perceived value of cellular licenses has now
outstripped broadcasting licenses and, given the past
litigiousness of this service during the initial licens-
ing process, any number of renewal challenges can
be expected. The Commission has described the com-
parative hearing process as "unacceptably complex,
costly, and slow"'" and in one report to Congress
categorically stated: "Because the comparative re-
newal process involves an evaluation of an existing
licensee's record as against the competing applicant's
proposals . . . it is conceptually unsatisfac-
tory. . . ."" Accordingly, avoiding comparative re-
newal hearings through a bifurcated renewal process
would save millions of dollars in both industry and
Commission resources. 5
This Article will review the Citizens case and its
accepted for filing. The renewal expectancy issue would be con-
sidered first, and if awarded to the incumbent, a dispositive pref-
erence then would be given. Thereafter, the competing applica-
tions would be denied without a further hearing.
In keeping with broadcast precedent, the Commission decided
that a non-broadcast incumbent who is awarded a renewal ex-
pectancy would instead be awarded a rebuttable presumption of
renewal expectancy. Thereafter, a full comparative hearing will
be held involving four different issues with many subparts. Re-
port and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 719, para. 18. The renewal prefer-
ence was made "the most important factor" in a renewal pro-
ceeding. Id. See also In re Reexamination of the Policy
Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making, 7 FCC Red. 2664, 2671 n.1 (1992) ("Com-
parative renewal proceedings differ from new applicant proceed-
ings because of the great importance in comparative renewal
proceedings given to whether the incumbent has earned a re-
newal expectancy based on [past performance] . . . . Nonethe-
less, in comparative renewal proceedings where the incumbent
has not earned a renewal expectancy, the applicants are com-
pared as if they were all new applicants.").
11 In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish
New Personal Communications Services, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 7 FCC Red. 5676, para. 23 (1992) (describing
the history of comparative hearings in licensing initial cellular
systems). The Commission also noted that "two major problems
associated with comparative hearings are cost and delay. It is not
uncommon for litigation to take years, with participants incur-
ring huge legal bills.... There is also considerable doubt as to
whether using comparative hearings for non-broadcast services
furthers the public interest." Id. app. D at 5762 (emphasis
added).
14 See FCC, Report of the Federal Communications Com-
mission to the Congress of the United States re The Compara-
tive Renewal Process 21, para. 32.
15 For example, in comparative hearings to license the top
thirty cellular markets, the average hearing time from the filing
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recent application to cellular renewal proceedings by
the Commission. The authors conclude that the Citi-
zens case does not limit the Commission's authority
to bifurcate the renewal process in the common car-
rier services. First, Citizens relied on the unique
First Amendment nature of broadcasting and second,
section 307 of the Communications Act specifically
authorizes the FCC to grant the renewal applica-
tions of incumbents upon a public interest finding.
Moreover, section 307 and its legislative history were
never properly accounted for in the Citizens case.
This Article also demonstrates that subsequent
case law has substantially narrowed the Supreme
Court's decision in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC,"6 on which Citizens relies. The authors thus
assert that the Commission is free to adopt a renewal
process for non-broadcast licensees under the Act
that excludes consideration of competing applications
where a determination is made that the incumbent
licensee served the public interest. The authors also
conclude that the Commission can utilize this process
not only in the cellular service, but in new licensing
regimes such as personal communications services
and "low-earth orbit" satellites.
A. The Citizens Case Failed to Account for Criti-
cal Changes in the Communications Act
The language of the Communications Act imposes
few specific requirements on the FCC and grants the
Commission broad powers to define the public inter-
est by rule." Section 307(c) specifically permits the
FCC to grant renewal applications upon a public in-
terest finding.18 Nothing in the text of section 307(c)
requires, as part of that public interest finding, the
consideration of mutually exclusive applications.
Specifically, nothing in the Act requires the FCC to
"'open a window" for the filing of renewal challenges
if the Commission finds that a renewal application
merits renewal.
Nevertheless, in Citizens, the Court of Appeals
struck down a 1970 FCC policy statement which an-
nounced the agency's future intention to avoid com-
of applications to: (1) designation for hearing was 304 days; (2)
the close of the hearing record was 514 days; (3) release of the
initial decision was 606 days; and (4) grant of the construction
permit was 752 days.
1 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
17 47 U.S.C. § 3030) (1988).
" See Appendix for the text of Section 307(c).
19 Citizens, 447 F.2d at 1214.
20 Ashbacker, 326 U.S. at 332-33.
21 Citizens, 447 F.2d at 1211.
parative hearings in the broadcast renewal process
where it had been determined that the incumbent
had served the public interest during the license
term.19 The case was based on an extension of
Ashbacker, which held that section 309 of the Com-
munications Act required simultaneous consideration
of mutually exclusive applications for an open
broadcast frequency.20 The Citizens court recognized
that Ashbacker did not involve a renewal situation,
but noted off-handedly that "no one has seriously
suggested that its principle does not apply to renewal
proceedings as well."2
1. The Citizens Argument before the Court
The brief filed by Citizens Communications
Center ("Citizens") concentrated primarily on sec-
tion 309(e) of the Act 22-the provision on which the
Ashbacker Court had relied-and not section 307.
Under section 309(e), the Commission must hold a
hearing on an application whenever there are sub-
stantial or material questions presented or insuffi-
cient information to determine whether a grant of a
license will serve the public interest.28
The arguments discussed in the Citizens court's
decision revolved around how the Commission's
1970 Policy Statement would disenfranchise the op-
portunity for minorities to have a voice in their com-
munity.2' The Citizens court cited the fact that of
7,500 broadcast licenses issued, racial minorities
owned no more than a dozen. 5 Thus, Citizens con-
cluded that "in order to satisfy the First Amendment
there must be an opportunity for all to compete at
renewal time for existing frequencies."26
In its brief, Citizens did mention section 307(c) of
the Act as setting up license terms and allowing the
FCC to treat renewal applicants differently than ini-
tial applicants.27 Specifically, Citizens focused on an
exchange between CBS Vice-President Joseph Ream
and Congressman John E. Bennett (R-MI) during a
1951 hearing on proposed amendments to section
307. In the exchange, Congressman Bennett sug-
gested to Mr. Ream that his view of the amend-
22 Brief for Appellant at 20-25, Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (No. 24,221
and 24,471) [hereinafter Brief].
23 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1988). See, e.g., United States v.
FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
24 Citizens, 447 F.2d at 1214 n.38.
25 Id. at 1213 n.36.
2 Brief, supra note 23, at 35 (quoting Red Lion Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 398 (1969)).
27 Brief, supra note 23, at 7-8.
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ment-that the FCC must first determine whether
the incumbent had served the public interest before
considering a competing application-"should be
written in[to 307(d)] so that there would not be any
doubt about it."'28 Citizens went on to conclude that
since no such language was added to the Act, the
FCC's discretion to adopt its proposed bifurcated re-
newal process was never authorized, and therefore
the Act did not relieve incumbents from participating
in a comparative hearing, even where their past per-
formance was meritorious.
29
2. The Citizens Decision
The Citizens decision focused almost exclusively
on Ashbacker, section 309 of the Act, and the unique
nature of broadcasting. In overturning the FCC's
1970 policy statement, the court held that in a
broadcast renewal proceeding, a challenger is enti-
tled to a comparative hearing on the merits of his
own application even if the incumbent is found de-
serving of license renewal because of the unique,
speech-related nature of broadcasting and the Com-
mission's policy of encouraging diverse ownership of
the mass media.3" The court found that regardless of
how meritorious the record of an incumbent broad-
caster might be, there was always a remaining issue
of fact to be resolved in a hearing with respect to
diversity of ownership of those scarce mass media
outlets."1 Thus, if the FCC decides to eliminate di-
versity as a broadcasting criteria, the vitality of the
Citizens case would be in doubt, although there is
some language in the case discussing a First Amend-
ment right to challenge an incumbent broadcaster.3 2
There are no diversity rules or First Amendment
concerns in services other than mass media. There-
fore, the court's ruling in Citizens does not establish
the automatic existence of an issue of fact with re-
gard to diversity of ownership if a competing appli-
cation is filed in a non-mass media service. Thus, at
a minimum, Citizens does not restrict FCC discre-
tion to adopt a cellular renewal procedure that
avoids comparative hearings where the incumbent li-
censee has served the public interest during its li-
cense term. The Citizens case is clearly indicated by
28 Brief, supra note 23, at 8. See Amending Communications
Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 658 before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 325-26
(1951) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 658].
29 Brief, supra note 23, at 7-8.
20 Citizens, 447 F.2d at 1214.
Si Id. at 1213-14 n.36 "[Tihe Commission simply cannot
make a valid public interest determination [in the broadcast ser-
the court:
Since one very significant aspect of the 'public interest,
convenience, and necessity' is the need for diverse and an-
tagonistic sources of information, the Commission simply
cannot make a valid public interest determination without
considering the extent to which the ownership of the me-
dia will be concentrated or diversified by the grant of one
or another of the applications before it.. . . The Supreme
Court itself has on numerous occasions recognized the dis-
tinct connection between diversity of ownership of the
mass media and the diversity of ideas and expression re-
quired by the First Amendment. . . . As new interest
groups and hitherto silent minorities emerge in our soci-
ety, they should be given some stake in and chance to
broadcast on our radio and television frequencies. Accord-
ing to the uncontested testimony of petitioners, no more
than a dozen of 7,500 broadcast licenses issued are owned
by racial minorities. The effect of the 1970 Policy State-
ment, ruled illegal today, would certainly have been to
perpetuate this dismaying situation. . . .Diversification
is a factor properly to be weighed and balanced with other
important factors, including the renewal applicant's prior
record, at a renewal hearing.3
Thus, the Court asserted the rationale behind its rul-
ing was as follows:
Petitioners have come to this court to protest a Commis-
sion policy which violates the clear intent of the Commu-
nications Act that the award of a broadcasting license
should be a 'public trust.' As a unanimous Supreme Court
recently put it, '[i]t is the right of the viewers and listen-
ers, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.'
Our decision today restores healthy competition by repu-
diating a Commission policy which is unreasonably
weighted in favor of the licensees it is meant to regulate,
to the great detriment of the listening and viewing
public.'
First Amendment diversification considerations, as
discussed above, are unique to mass media services.
In fact, the court in Network Project v. FCC"5 sum-
marily rejected petitioner's effort to apply First
Amendment rights to the listening and speaking
public in the common carrier context:
Petitioner contends, however, that the Commission in
some way abridged the First Amendment rights of poten-
tial listeners or speakers by failing to assure access of all
points of view to the carriers' lines. It cites no cases, and
we know of none, applying the doctrine of Red Lion
vice] without considering the extent to which the ownership of
the media will be concentrated or diversified by the grant of one
or another of the applications before it." Id. (citations omitted).
32 Id.
33 Id. (emphasis added).
I Id. at 1214 (citations omitted).
35 511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C. [sic], to common
carriers. 8
Moreover, this distinction has also been clearly
recognized by Congress. In a 1982 amendment to the
Communications Act permitting the use of a random
selection system for certain licenses,3 7  Congress
adopted a diversification preference scheme exclu-
sively for mass media services applications:
[Bly definition [common carriers] ...do not exclusively
control the content of the information or programming
which is transmitted over their facilities. Thus, section
309(i), as amended by this bill, only requires significant
[diversification of control] preferences to be applied to li-
censes or construction permits for any media of mass
communications.36
3. The 1952 Change in Section 307(c) of the Com-
munications Act
The Citizens decision paid scant attention to sec-
tion 307(c) of the Act. The only reference was con-
tained in a footnote which stated:
Perhaps to guard against the inference that an incum-
bent's past broadcast record could not be considered at all
at renewal time, Congress in 1952 deleted the provision
subjecting renewal applications to 'the same considerations
and practice' as original applications, substituting the pro-
vision of the 1927 Act which subjected renewal and origi-
nal applications alike to the standard of 'public interest,
convenience and necessity.'3
Both the plain language of section 307(c) and its
legislative history are important in resolving the is-
sue of Commission discretion to adopt bifurcation.
Though never mentioned in Citizens, Congress made
important changes in the text of section 307(d), cur-
rently section 307(c), in 1952. Prior to the 1952
amendments, the statute stated that action on re-
newal applications "shall be limited to and governed
by the same considerations and practice which affect
the granting of original applications. "40 This proviso
was eliminated in 1952 and the "public interest"
standard was added so that section 307(c) now reads:
3" Id. at 795 (citations omitted). In Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme Court observed
that "(blecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Govern-
ment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium." Id. at
390. It further added that: "It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Id.
87 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1982).
36 H.R. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1982).
Citizens, 447 F.2d at 1206 n.13 (emphasis added).
"Upon the expiration of any license, upon applica-
tion therefor, a renewal of such license may be
granted. . . if the Commission finds that [the] pub-
lic interest . . .would be served thereby."41 Con-
gress also added the following sentence:
In order to expedite action on applications for renewal of
broadcasting station licenses and in order to avoid needless
expense to applicants for such renewals, the Commission
shall not require any such applicant to file any informa-
tion which previously has been furnished to the Commis-
sion or which is not directly material to the considerations
that affect the granting or denial of such application, but
the Commission may require any new or additional facts
it deems necessary to make its findings.' 2
The above statutory changes thus authorized the
FCC to greatly expedite consideration of the applica-
tions of incumbent licensees, as the Senate Report on
the amendment clearly reflects:
Once a license has been granted, there appears to be not
[sic] good reason why the Commission should be required
to take into consideration many of the factors which it
should and must take into consideration in granting a li-
cense in the first instance. Such matters as the character
and ability of the applicant to operate a broadcast station
or his financial ability to construct and maintain a station
are important factors for the Commission to consider in
evaluating original applications for a broadcast station;
they no longer may be pertinent factors when the Com-
mission is giving consideration to renewal of a station li-
cense. It should be emphasized that while the recom-
mended amendment does eliminate the necessity for the
type of involved and searching examination which the
Commission must make in granting an original license, it
does not in any way impair the Commission's right and
duty to consider, in the case of a station which has been in
operation and is applying for renewal, the over-all per-
formance of that station against the broad standard of
public interest, convenience, and necessity. This authority
of the Commission is made explicit by specifying that such
renewal grants are subject to findings by the Commission
that the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity would
be served thereby'. . . . [T]he objective of the recom-
mended changes is to expedite the administrative consider-
ation of the renewal process and to reduce the work load
and expenditure on both the licensee and the
Commission. 3
40 Communications Act of 1934, Ch. 652, § 307(d), 48 Stat.
1064, 1084 (1934) (prior to 1952 amendments).
41 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1988).
42 Id. See also Appendix. While the text explicitly refers to
broadcasting station licenses, the legislative history makes clear
that Congress intended this section to apply to all Commission
licensees. See discussion infra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text. The reference to broadcast licenses can be attributed to the
fact that broadcasting was the predominant service at the time.
'1 S. REP. No. 44, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1951). See also
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
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An in-depth examination of the legislative history
indicates that the 1952 amendments to section 307
were intended to allow the FCC to consider first
whether a renewal applicant would serve the public
interest (based on past performance) and, assuming
such a finding could be made, to allow the FCC to
grant the application without considering renewal
challenges. The bill, which was enacted into law in
1952, was introduced on the floor of the Senate and
sponsored by Senator McFarland, the subcommittee
chairman. The proposed legislation, known as the
"McFarland Bill," was introduced in two Con-
gresses as S. 1973 and S. 658."" These bills were es-
sentially identical.4 In the hearings on the initial
bill, Senator McFarland made it perfectly clear he
intended the change to actually prohibit the FCC
from entertaining comparative renewal challenges in
instances where it found that grant of the renewal
application would serve the public interest."
In the Senate hearings on the McFarland Bill,
FCC Commissioner Rosel Hyde testified that there
was a division of opinion among the seven Commis-
sioners on the merits of the proposed legislation.47 A
majority objected to the bill because they believed it
would prohibit the FCC from considering competing
applications at renewal time if it could be deter-
mined that the granting of the renewal application
would serve the public interest.4 The minority (in-
cluding Commissioner Hyde) supported the bill, be-
lieving it would merely make the consideration of
competing renewal applications permissive.4 In
other words, the minority viewed the bill as allowing
the FCC to bifurcate the renewal process or decide,
on policy grounds, that consideration of a renewal
challenge was a critical element in deciding whether
to grant an incumbent's renewal application would
serve the public interest. 50 With this background, the
following lengthy exchange occurred:
SENATOR MCFARLAND. Mr. Hyde, I would call your at-
775, 811 n.31 (1978) [hereinafter NCCB], where the Supreme
Court noted that the Senate Report stated "the Commission has
the 'right and duty to consider, in the case of a station which has
been in operation and is applying for renewal, the overall per-
formance of that station against the broad standard of public in-
terest, convenience, and necessity.'"
5' S. 1973, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. 658, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951).
"' See Hearings on S. 658, supra note 28, at 62. (Statement
of Hon. Wayne Coy, Chairman, FCC) ("As you gentlemen are
undoubtedly aware, except for four minor amendments . . . S.
658 is identical with S. 1973 which passed the Senate during
the Eighty-First Congress and on which this committee held ex-
tensive hearings last August.").
4" See Amendments to Communications Act of 1934: Hear-
tention to this: The only part of section 307 (d) omitted
from the bill under discussion is the wording:
but action of the Commission with reference to the
granting of such application for the renewal of a
license shall be limited to and governed by the same
considerations and practice which affect the grant-
ing of original applications.
Now, that deletion does not destroy or modify the right of
the Commission. As a matter of fact, section 309 provides
that the Commission in granting a license must determine
that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would
be served by the granting thereof.
MR. HYDE. Yes.
SENATOR MCFARLAND. That is still in the bill as writ-
ten. As I interpret it-and if I am not correct, I want you
to correct me, because what we are trying to do is to get
the best possible law here-is if you find that the public
interest and convenience and necessity are satisfied, you
would grant him the license. But if at any time it would
not be in the public interest to grant this license, you
would have the right to deny it.
Now the change proposed here is in the fact if a present
licensee makes an application for renewal, and you still
felt it was in the public interest that license would be re-
newed. But under the existing law you would have the
right to compare the service that the existing license gave
with the promises of some applicant who might be apply-
ing for the same frequency in that community.
You do not, in fact, know what kind of service the new
applicant is going to give by making that comparison, be-
cause he has never had a license; he has not operated a
station. Whether a license should be canceled and given to
some new applicant, merely because the Commission feels,
'Here is an applicant that certainly has put forward a
good paper application' is the question. Is that not the
real question?
MR. HYDE. Senator, I think you are right, but that as-
sumes, if I might say so, there would be no difficulty in
ings on S. 1973 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 121,
126 (1949) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1973].
47 Id. at 29.
48 Id.
41 Id. at 30.
50 Mr. Hyde also believed the public interest standard ought
to be directly inserted into section 307 to make the renewal stan-
dard perfectly clear. Id. Senator McFarland initially believed
this was unnecessary because the public interest standard was
referred to in section 309. Id. However, as the text of present
section 307 reflects, the phrase was specifically added to prevent




the legal construction of this statute as proposed to be
changed.
SENATOR MCFARLAND. The Commission would be in-
correct in asserting that a license would be a perpetual
grant under the proposed new language. He has got at all
times, and you have got to find every time, that he serves
the public interest.
MR. HYDE. I have no doubt in my mind but what that
[sic] is the thought you have, Senator.
SENATOR MCFARLAND. It is written in the law in section
309.
MR. HYDE. Right you are. But in this proposed change
you would delete this language: 'Considerations on re-
newal shall be the same as on original application.'
It so happens in the Act the considerations on examina-
tion of original application are public interest, conve-
nience, and necessity. I could not help but show some con-
cern about the significance that might be attached to the
removal of that language. It may well be that finally the
view which you express would prevail, but in the
meantime I feel that we would have litigation and perhaps
some doubt.
Now Commissioner Jones and I have suggested a
change here which might be of some help.
SENATOR McFARLAND. Your suggestion is practically the
same as is already written in 309, is it not?
MR. HYDE. It is, except we would insert at this very place
where the proposed bill would strike out certain language.
And if that were done we would have the result which I
believe you have in mind.
SENATOR MCFARLAND. Without raising the question you
have.
MR. HYDE. That is correct.
51
As a result, the public interest standard was added to
section 307 as the renewal standard.
At another juncture, Senator McFarland and a
Department of Justice representative had the follow-
" Hearings on S. 1973, supra note 46, at 29-30 (emphasis
added).
Id. at 121, 126 (emphasis added).
Id. at 21. Subsequent cases not involving the review of an
FCC license renewal policy have recognized the significance of
this 1952 change in distinguishing the treatment of incumbent
licensees from new applicants. For example, in NCCB, the Su-
preme Court, in upholding FCC regulations prohibiting com-
ing exchange which emphasizes that the Chairman's
only intention in introducing the bill was to elimi-
nate renewal challenges from consideration, once a
renewal applicant was found deserving of renewal
under the public interest standard:
SENATOR McFARLAND. The only difference that this bill
makes is that the renewal applicant would not be required
to go through all of the details that an original applicant
must. It provides in section 309 that the Commission must
find the grant is in the public interest, convenience and
necessity. Now, what more do you think that the Commis-
sion should be required to find than that?
MR. HUME. Well-
SENATOR MCFARLAND. Do you think, for instance, if
there are two applicants, that the Commission should de-
termine, based in one case on a paper promise that maybe
one of them who does not have a dollar invested should be
given this license because he makes a better paper show-
ing than someone who has half a million dollars invested
whose record of performance is before the Commission?
MR. HUME. No, sir; I do not.
SENATOR MCFARLAND. Well, then, you agree with the
provisions of the present bill instead of disagreeing, be-
cause that is all that this bill does. The only difference in
this bill and the law is that it does not permit the Com-
mission to make a comparison between them; to put the
licensee on a new-applicant status and thus have to go
through all of the provisions of the law in regard to an
application for a new station.
SENATOR McFARLAND. Now, the only difference, as I see
it, the only thing that could be argued that [my bill] does
away with, is a comparative basis of some new applicant
and some old applicant.5"
The Department of Justice and CBS also observed
that the new law did not appear to allow the FCC to
entertain renewal challengers after it found the in-
cumbent had served the public interest during the
past license term.5 At a minimum, the plain words
of the amended section 307 gave the FCC discretion
mon ownership of media in a community, stated:
Nothing in the language or the legislative history of
§ 303(g) indicates that Congress intended to foreclose all
differences in treatment between new and existing li-
censes, and indeed, in amending § 307(d) of the Act in
1952, Congress appears to have lent its approval to the
Commission's policy of evaluating existing licensees on a
somewhat different basis from new applicants.
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in determining whether a renewal applicant had met
the public interest standard before considering com-
peting applications.
4. Post Ashbacker Changes in Section 309 Nar-
rowed the Hearing Rights of Competing
Applicants
In 1945, the Supreme Court decided Ashbacker,
with Justice Douglas writing for the majority and
Justice Frankfurter dissenting. At the time, radio li-
censes were still available in even the largest markets
and television was only in its experimental stages.
Two applicants had applied for an initial radio
broadcasting license in Grand Rapids, Michigan.54
The Commission summarily granted one application
and designated the other for hearing.55 The Supreme
Court reversed, specifically holding that in an initial
broadcast license context, "where two bona fide ap-
plications are mutually exclusive the grant of one
without a hearing to both deprives the loser of the
opportunity which Congress chose to give him"
under section 309 of the Act.56
The Court stated, however, in dictum: "§ 309(a)
not only gives the Commission authority to grant li-
censes without a hearing, but also gives applicants a
right to a hearing before their applications are de-
nied."5 7 At the time, present section 309(e) did not
exist and, as indicated below, section 309(a) was sus-
ceptible to the interpretation that before any applica-
tion-including renewal challenges-could be de-
nied, a hearing must be held:
If ... the Commission shall determine that [the] public
interest ... would be served by the granting [of an appli-
cation], it shall authorize the issuance, renewal or modifi-
cation thereof.... In the event the Commission ...
does not reach such decision with respect thereto, it shall
... fix and give notice of a time and place for hearing
thereon. .... 58
436 U.S. at 810-811. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit later affirmed the Commission's de-
regulation of radio and television renewal requirements allowing
a mere postcard application to be filed by incumbent licensees at
renewal. See Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d
407, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255
(1984). In accord with NCCB, the Court emphasized that a
1952 change in section 307 specifically differentiated between in-
itial licensing and renewals and that Congress had emphasized
that the Commission should conserve administrative and licensee
resources as much as possible with regard to license renewals.
Id.
54 Ashbacker, 326 U.S. at 328.
55 Id.
In addition, based on the earlier version of section
309, the Ashbacker opinion did contemplate that the
Commission could in the future place important lim-
its on applicants' hearing rights under appropriate
circumstances. The Court observed:
It is suggested that the Commission, by granting the
Fetzer application first, concluded that the public interest
would be furthered by making Fetzer's service available at
the earliest possible date. If so, that conclusion is only an
inference from what the Commission did. There is no sug-
gestion, let alone a finding, by the Commission that the
demands of the public interest were so urgent as to pre-
clude the delay which would be occasioned by a hearing.5"
The Court also implied that, for orderly administra-
tion, the FCC could adopt rules governing the ac-
ceptance of applications and ensuring they were
bona fide.60
At the time Ashbacker was decided, section 307(d)
of the Act stated that action of the Commission with
reference to the granting of an application for the
renewal of a license "[shall be limited] to the same
considerations and practice which affect the granting
of original applications."'" Again, in 1952 Congress
eliminated this proviso and added the aforemen-
tioned public interest standard. 2 Moreover, as the
Commission's authority to regulate the renewal pro-
cess expanded, applicants' hearing rights under sec-
tion 309 narrowed after Ashbacker. In the 1956 case
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,63 the Su-
preme Court significantly narrowed Ashbacker by
rejecting its dictum that section 309 required a hear-
ing on every application before the FCC could deny
it.
In Storer, the applicant argued that section 309, as
interpreted in Ashbacker, invariably requires a hear-
ing before denial of an application even though grant
of its application would have violated the Commis-
sion's multiple ownership rules.6 The court of ap-
peals had agreed with the Commission that section
309 did not always require a hearing despite its "ap-
58 Id. at 333 (emphasis in original).
57 Id. at 330.
8 Id. at 330 n.4. In other words, if the Commission accepts
both the renewal application and challenging application for fil-
ing, it cannot find that both applications serve the public inter-
est, as only one license will be issued. Thus, the Commission
must find that one of the applications does not satisfy the public
interest, thereby triggering the Ashbacker hearing requirement.
59 Id. at 333.
60 Id. at 333 n.9.
81 See id. at 332.
62 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
63 351 U.S. 192 (1955).
64 Id. at 195.
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parently unqualified" language. Nevertheless, it
found that the applicant had a right to a hearing in
the particular setting of the case."5
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that section
309 did not require a hearing in cases where the un-
disputed facts show that grant of the application
would contravene the Commission's perception of the
public interest
We agree with the contention of the Commission that a
full hearing, such as is required by § 309. . . would not
be necessary on all such applications. . . . We do not
think Congress intended the Commission to waste time on
applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing. 6
Thus, implicit in the Court's ruling was a change
in the reading of section 309 from requiring a hear-
ing whenever the FCC found itself unable to grant
an application to requiring a hearing on an applica-
tion only when the Commission was unable to deter-
mine whether or not a grant of the application
would serve the public interest (i.e., lacked sufficient
information). The Court emphasized that the Com-
munications Act had to be read as a whole. There-
fore, an applicant's right to a hearing had to be bal-
anced against the Commission's larger duty to define
the public interest and regulate emerging communi-
cations technologies that rely on federal licenses.6 7
In 1960, Congress created new section 309(d) that
gave the Commission broad discretion to avoid hear-
ings on petitions to deny unless a "substantial and
material question of fact" was presented. 8 The sec-
ond proviso in old section 309(d), that the FCC must
hold a hearing if unable to arrive at a public interest
decision, was also retained.
New section 309(e) was also created as the succes-
sor to old section 309(b), the provision which de-
scribed when an application that was not subject to a
petition to deny must be designated for hearing. The
same "substantial and material questions of fact"
and "unable to make the finding" language was in-
corporated into section 309(e). The word "whether"
was also added to section 309(a). Thus, in both peti-
66 Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 204,
208 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
" Storer, 351 U.S. at 205.
67 Id. at 203.
66 See S. REP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959). See
also 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1988).
66 Communications Act Amendments, 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3516, 3521.
"' In Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d
320, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court observed that "the decision
of whether or not hearings are necessary or desirable is a matter
in which the Commission's discretion and expertise is para-
tion to deny and application settings, the Commis-
sion was required to designate an application for
hearing only where it was unable to decide whether
the public interest would be served by a grant or
where there was a material issue of fact needing res-
olution. The fact that subsections (d) and (e) con-
tained parallel hearing criteria-substantial question
of fact and inability to decide the public inter-
est-meant a narrowing not only of a petitioner's en-
titlement to a hearing but also of an applicant's right
to a hearing. In fact, the Committee Report accom-
panying the legislation stated that "the [C]ommittee
expects that the Commission will use any procedural
devices available to it to expedite its business." 9
After the implementation of new section 309, the
Commission was routinely affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in de-
nying hearings to petitioners who' had not raised
substantial and material issues of fact°.7  The court
also interpreted the "unable to make the finding"
proviso of section 309 as requiring hearings only
where the Commission had too little information to
decide whether or not the application would serve
the public interest. For example, in United States v.
FCC,71 the court of appeals ruled en banc that:
Section 309(e) does not 'give[] the Commission no [sic] au-
thority to consider the public interest in deciding whether
a hearing must be conducted(.]'. . . Section 309(e) re-
quires an evidentiary hearing if a substantial and material
question of fact is presented, or if the FCC is unable to
reach a determination on the public interest .... The
substantiality and materiality of purported issues of fact,
and the need for further information, are issues to be eval-
uated in the first instance by the Commission in the light
of its public interest responsibility. This court's oversight
role is quite limited.72
In RKO General, Inc. v. FCC,7" the court of ap-
peals made clear that even renewal applications
could be denied under section 309 without a full evi-
dentiary hearing where there were no issues of fact
and there was sufficient information upon which to
mount. We must examine the Commission's statement of reasons
for denial, and if the Commission's action was not arbitrary, ca-
pricious or unreasonable, we must afflirm." See, e.g., Southwest-
ern Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("Congress intended to vest in the FCC a large discretion to
avoid time-consuming hearings in this field whenever possible..
• .") (emphasis added).
71 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
7 Id. at 90-91 n.87 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).





Thus, in contrast to Ashbacker, the law under sec-
tion 309 has now evolved to the point where hear-
ings are required on FCC applications (for renewal
or for initial licensing) only where there is an issue
of fact to resolve or where the FCC lacks sufficient
information to reach a decision on the application.
The dictum in Ashbacker stating that section 309 re-
quires a hearing before any application can be de-
nied was effectively eliminated in Storer.
B. Recent Case Law Narrowly Interpreting
Ashbacker Further Signals a Departure from
Citizens
In keeping with a changing judiciary, the founda-
tion of the Citizens case-Ashbacker-has been lim-
ited by court decisions virtually to its facts in a num-
ber of recent cases involving open frequency
situations where mutually exclusive applicants were
similarly situated. Beginning with Cellular Mobile
Systems of Pennsylvania v. FCC," the court recog-
nized the FCC's authority to adopt "streamlined
procedures" for processing cellular applications so as
to expedite cellular proceedings. 76 Further, the court
referred to the Communications Act as a "supple in-
strument for the exercise of discretion . . . ." by the
Commission and stated that "[a]s technology devel-
ops and the field of communications changes, proce-
dural, as well as substantive, policy must be flexi-
ble."" Based on this expansive view of the statute,
the court also stated that the "full hearing" require-
ment of section 309 "does not, by its terms, require a
traditional, trial-type evidentiary hearing at all;
quite to the contrary, the Commission could, under
settled law, determine that the 'demands of the pub-
lic interest were so urgent as to preclude the delay
which would be occasioned by a hearing.' "7
Thereafter, in Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v.
FCC,79 the petitioner argued that the Commission's
decision to use a lottery rather than comparative
74 Id. at 231-33.
" 782 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
78 Id. at 197.
"7 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
71 Id. (quoting Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S.
327, 333 (1945)).
8 815 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
80 Id. at 1555 (emphasis added).
81 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
82 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978); Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC,
719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255
(1984).
hearing, after the filing of its application, deprived it
of its right to a comparative hearing under
Ashbacker. Judges Bork, Buckley, and H. Greene
unanimously disagreed, stating that "[t]he Ashbacker
decision found no such 'right,' but merely held that
the Commission must use the same set of procedures
to process the applications of all similarly situated
persons who come before it seeking the same
license."8' 0
A renewal applicant and an applicant for an ini-
tial license are not similarly situated. This point was
especially emphasized by the 1952 amendments to
section 307, where Congress differentiated between
initial and renewal applicants.81 The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has also
confirmed that Congress intended a meaningful dif-
ference between such entities.8
2
Similarly, in Public Utility Comm'n of the State
of California v. FERC,"8 Judges Williams, Wald,
and R. Ginsburg upheld a decisive preference
scheme granted to certain applicants despite the exis-
tence of other mutually-exclusive applications. The
court stated that Ashbacker "requir[es] only that an
agency 'use the same set of procedures to process the
applications of all similarly situated persons who
come before it seeking the same license.' "84 The
court aptly observed that if Ashbacker applied to
non-similarly situated applications, "such a principle
would destroy any agency's decision to streamline
adjudicatory procedures for a specifically defined
class of applicants ....
In Hispanic Information and Telecommunications
Network, Inc. v. FCC ("HITN"),86 Judges Wald,
Robinson, and Edwards upheld a Commission deter-
mination, after notice and comment, that the public
interest would best be served if local ITFS appli-
cants were granted an absolute priority over non-lo-
cal applicants.87 Returning to the view of section 309
after the 1960 change in the Act, the court observed
that:
83 900 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 278 (emphasis in original).
85 Id. (emphasis in original). In re Establishment of Proce-
dures to Provide a Preference to Applicants Proposing an Allo-
cation for New Services, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 3488,
para. 33, n.5 (1991), recon., 7 FCC Rcd. 1808, para. 8 (1992),
the Commission ruled that California PUC v. FERC and Storer
permit the Commission to adopt rules providing for a "disposi-
tive preference," permitting grants without comparative hearings
to applicants entitled to the preference.
86 865 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
87 Id. at 1294.
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Given the absence of disputed factual issues, no Ashbacker
hearing is necessary. Such a hearing would either require
FCC reconsideration of established policy, or else it would
be a pointless formality in which the result was pre-
ordained. The filing of an application creates no
vested right to a hearing; if the substantive standards
change so that the applicant is no longer qualified, the
application may be dismissed.8"
The court also indicated that "[tihe Communications
Act requires a comparative hearing only when 'a
substantial and material question of fact is presented
or the Commission for any reason is unable to make
[a public interest] finding.' "89
Explaining the latter clause further, the court
quoted United States v. FCC,9" which emphasized
that deference should be given to the Commission's
determinations regarding "[tlhe substantiality and
materiality of purported issues of fact, and the need
for further information." '9 1 The HITN court added
that "[t]he statute does not preclude the FCC from
establishing threshold standards to identify qualified
applicants and excluding those applicants who
plainly fail to meet the standards." '92 Once the Com-
mission decided, as a threshold matter, that it was in
the public interest to renew existing licensees' appli-
cations where their past record merited it, the filing
of a competing application would not raise any sub-
stantial and material questions of fact needing reso-
lution in a hearing; nor would the Commission be in
a position of being unable to make a public interest
determination. Viewed another way, competing ap-
plicants would simply fail to meet the eligibility re-
quirement, similar to the way an otherwise eligible
non-local ITFS applicant effectively became ineligi-
ble when competing with a local applicant in the
HITN case.
In La Star Cellular Telephone Co. v. FCC,9"
Judges D.H. Ginsburg, Buckley, and Williams
unanimously upheld an FCC interim operating or-
der allowing the existing New Orleans cellular licen-
see to continue operating in a contested area during
the pendency of an upcoming comparative hearing.94
The court seemed to anticipate a change in the
FCC's previously restrictive view of Ashbacker
observing:
Id. at 1294-95 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1294 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(e)).
652 F.2d 72, 91 n.87 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
HITN, 865 F.2d at 1294.
Id.
899 F.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1235 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
949 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Ashbacker Court also implied that the Commission
could, without a hearing, grant one of two competing ap-
plications for a permanent license if it found that the pub-
lic interest demanded such urgency. This court has not
confronted precisely that situation, but we have said that
Ashbacker does not preclude the Commission from issuing
an interim license, without a hearing on competing appli-
cations, if the Commission validly determines that the
public interest so requires.95
An FCC order adopting a renewal process in cellu-
lar similar to the bifurcated process proposed in the
1970 policy statement overturned by Citizens would
obviously be predicated on such a public interest
finding. Yet, such a procedure would still permit
comparative hearings to be held in instances where it
was determined that the public interest had not been
served by the incumbent.
In Rainbow Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,"8 Judges
Sentelle, Mikva (Chief Judge), and Henderson af-
firmed an FCC order which precluded the filing of
competing applications for UHF television channel
swaps among incumbent licensees. The court
emphasized:
[T]he Commission possesses the authority to change its
policies and interpretations of [Ashbacker, so long as it
provides a reasoned explanation. It may not, of course,
run afoul of definitive pronouncements of the Supreme
Court as to the meaning of statutory provisions, but it has
not done so in this case.9
The court then held that the:
so-called 'Ashbacker doctrine' arises from a decision in
which the High Court required the FCC to hold hearings
to compare competing applications for free channel space.
. .. But the Ashbacker court did not address the issue of
what circumstances create an 'open' frequency triggering
the competition requirement. Particularly, the Court
never said that the Commission must open a frequency for
competing applications whenever it assigns that frequency
to a community. 95
Thus, the court affirmed the FCC order not to enter-
tain competing applicants because the channel swap
effectively prevented Ashbacker rights from ripening
because no open channel was created for which to
apply.99
"' Id. at 408 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
98 Id. at 408-09 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
The court also emphasized the FCC's broad discretion in
defining the public interest:
[T]he Supreme Court has validated broad parameters
within which the FCC may further its view of the public
interest without interference from the courts. The Su-
preme Court has held that Congress delegated to the FCC
the task of making the initial determination of how its
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The Rainbow case would seem to make
Ashbacker's recognition of comparative hearing
rights inapplicable in a renewal setting-as long as
the Commission validly adopted rules establishing
that it was in the public interest to grant the renewal
application non-comparatively where the appropriate
incumbency showing had been made. In such a case,
there would be no free channel space for competing
applications since the incumbent's license would be
renewed.
Finally, in Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC
("ARINC T-),1oo Judges Edwards, Buckley, and
Williams reversed an FCC rulemaking order which,
in lieu of a comparative hearing, required bona fide
mutually exclusive applicants for an initial mobile
satellite license to form a consortium to hold the li-
cense. Thus, the situation was unlike a renewal set-
ting and more akin to the situation in Ashbacker.
Even in this setting, however, the court did not hold
that each applicant had an absolute right to a com-
parative hearing; rather, it ruled that the FCC had
not provided any "compelling reason" to avoid the
comparative process. 1 ' The court observed that "the
Supreme Court has recognized . . . the right to a
hearing created by section 309(e) is not absolute." 0 2
The court proceeded to describe various situations
where an application could be denied without a
hearing because an applicant violated a valid FCC
rule.103
The court nevertheless observed that Ashbacker
had added to section 309 a presumption, at least in
the setting of an initial license, that where two bona
fide applications are filed and are mutually exclu-
sive, the comparative licensing process will be uti-
lized. 04 It found that if it affirmed the Commission
order, the FCC could render the comparative hear-
policies may best serve the public interest.
Id. at 410 (citations omitted).
100 928 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
101 Id. at 453.
102 Id. at 439.
103 Id. See, e.g., Guinan v. FCC, 297 F.2d 782, 785 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) (holding no comparative hearing necessary once it has
been established that one of the competing applicants is basically
unqualified); Ranger v. FCC, 294 F.2d 240, 242-43 (D.C. Cir.
1961) (holding that where application fails in material respects
to comply with Commission rules, agency can reject application
without hearing).
104 ARINC I, 928 F.2d at 438, 450.
105 Id. at 452.
106 983 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
107 Id. at 284.
108 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
(1940). Congress, of course, has paramount power in the regula-
tory field and its authority to retroactively cut off applicants'
ing requirement in Ashbacker a nullity through the
exercise of its rulemaking authority."' On remand,
however, the Commission reaffirmed its consortium
order adding reasons to justify its departure from the
comparative hearing process. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit responded in
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC08 ("ARINC If')
by dismissing the appeal of the remand order on
standing grounds but warned in dictum:
We emphasize, however, that nothing in our decision to-
day should be read to suggest that the court accepts the
Commission's position that it possesses statutory authority
to impose the formation of a mandatory consortium of li-
cense applicants in lieu of holding comparative hearings.
In ARINC [I], we doubted the Commission's authority to
bypass comparative hearings in these circumstances....
That concern remains, but its resolution must await an-
other day.1""
Nothing in the court's decision, however, limited the
Commission's ability to avoid comparative hearings
in the renewal context. The case was clearly pre-
mised on initial licensing procedures and the unique
consortium ruling.
C. Conclusion
As a creature of Congress, the FCC is entrusted
with broad rulemaking discretion to define the public
interest.10 ' At the same time, section 309 of the
Communications Act provides some measure of pro-
cedural protection for initial applicants for an FCC
license.1 9 Renewal applicants, however, are placed
by section 307 in a special class apparently protected
from paper challenge if they have served the public
interest under section 307.
rights for the larger public good, under its broad Interstate Com-
merce Clause powers, has been upheld. Multi-State Communi-
cations, Inc. v. FCC, 728 F.2d 1519, 1526 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984) ("the mere expecta-
tions of a license applicant cannot bar the legitimate exercise of
such congressional power.").
FCC authority clearly parallels that of Congress as long as it
stays within its enabling act. See Transcontinent Television
Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (upholding
that deletion of channel at renewal was not against renewal ap-
plicant's right to a hearing). Congress broadened the FCC's pol-
icy-making authority in the area of new technologies by enacting
new section 7 to the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 157
(1988). See also Telocator Network of America v. FCC, 691
F.2d 525, 538 n.107 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing FCC v. WNCN
Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594-95 (1981)) (discussing the
breadth of FCC policy-making and the Court's deference
thereto).
109 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1988).
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The 1945 Ashbacker case added to section 309 the
general right to comparative consideration with re-
gard to bona fide mutually-exclusive applications for
an open broadcast license. In Citizens, however, the
court of appeals extended Ashbacker's recognition of
applicants' comparative hearing rights to the broad-
cast renewal process-based on the rights of the lis-
tening and viewing public and First Amendment
considerations, without fully considering the 1952
change in section 307.
The essence of the Citizens holding was that in
renewal challenges for broadcast licenses, there will
always be an issue of fact which must be heard con-
cerning diversity of ownership in a broadcast con-
text-whether or not the incumbent broadcaster has
operated meritoriously. No such issue exists in a
non-broadcast setting such as cellular or PCS, how-
ever, since diversity is not a relevant issue in these
services. Thus, section 309 is never implicated and
section 307 controls. Accordingly, the Commission
has the discretion to adopt, by rule, a bifurcated cel-
lular renewal process which grants an incumbent li-
censee's renewal application, irrespective of compet-
ing applications, as long as the FCC makes a
supportable finding that such a procedure is in the
public interest.*
APPENDIX
SECTION 307(D) [PRESENTLY SECTION 307(c)]**
Prior to the Communications Act Amendments of
1952
(d) No license granted for the operation of a broad-
casting station shall be for a longer term than three
years and no license so granted for any other class of
station shall be for a longer term than five years, and
any license granted may be revoked as hereinafter
provided. Upon the expiration of any license, upon
application therefor, a renewal of such license may
be granted from time to time for a term of not to
exceed three years in the case of broadcasting li-
censes and not to exceed five years in the case of
other licenses, but action of the Commission with
reference to the granting of such application for the
renewal of a license shall be limited to and governed
by the same considerations and practice which affect
the granting of original applications.
* Editor's Note- While awaiting publication, the Commis-
sion, in response to Petitions for Reconsideration filed in CC
Docket No. 90-358 by BellSouth Corporation and US West
NewVector Group, Inc., adopted a bifurcated renewal procedure
After the Communications Act Amendments of 195.2
(d) No license granted for the operation of a broad-
casting station shall be for a longer term than three
years and no license so granted for any other class of
station shall be for a longer term than five years, and
any license granted may be revoked as hereinafter
provided. Upon the expiration of any license, upon
application therefor, a renewal of such license may
be granted from time to time for a term of not to
exceed three years in the case of broadcasting li-
censes and not to exceed five years in the case of
other licenses, [but action of the Commission with
reference to the granting of such application for the
renewal of a license shall be limited to and governed
by the same considerations and practice which affect
the granting of original applications] if the Commis-
sion finds that public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity would be served thereby. In order to expedite
action on applications for renewal of broadcasting
station licenses and in order to avoid needless ex-
pense to applicants for such renewals, the Commis-
sion shall not require any such applicant to file any
information which previously has been furnished to
the Commission or which is not directly material to
the considerations that affect the granting or denial
of such application, but the Commission may require
any new or additional facts it deems necessary to
make its findings. Pending any hearing and final de-
cision on such an application and the disposition of
any petition for rehearing pursuant to section 405,
the Commission shall continue such license in effect.
Present Section 307
(c) No license granted for the operation of a televi-
sion broadcasting station shall be for a longer term
than [three] five years and no license so granted for
any other class of station (other than a radio broad-
casting station) shall be for a longer term than [five]
ten years, and any license granted may be revoked as
hereinafter provided. Each license granted for the
operation of a radio broadcasting station shall be for
a term of not to exceed seven years. The term of any
license for the operation of any auxiliary broadcast
station or equipment which can be used only in con-
junction with a primary radio, television, or transla-
tor station shall be concurrent with the term of the
for cellular renewals. See FCC Public Notice, Report No. DC-
2363, released March 11, 1993.
** Symbols used: [text removed]; text added.
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license for such primary radio, television, or transla-
tor station. Upon the expiration of any license, upon
application therefor, a renewal of such license may
be granted from time to time for a term of not to
exceed [three] five years in the case of television
broadcasting licenses, for a term not to exceed seven
years in the case of radio broadcasting station li-
censes, and for a term not to exceed [five] ten years
in the case of other licenses, if the Commission finds
that public interest, convenience, and necessity would
be served thereby. In order to expedite action on ap-
plications for renewal of broadcasting station licenses
and in order to avoid needless expense to applicants
for such renewals, the Commission shall not require
any such applicant to file any information which
previously has been furnished to the Commission or
which is not directly material to the considerations
that affect the granting or denial of such application,
but the Commission may require any new or addi-
tional facts it deems necessary to make its findings.
Pending any hearing and final decision on such an
application and the disposition of any petition for re-
hearing pursuant to section 405 of this title, the
Commission shall continue such license in effect.
Consistently with the foregoing provisions of this
subsection, the Commission may by rule prescribe
the period or periods for which licenses shall be
granted and renewed for particular classes of sta-
tions, but the Commission may not adopt or follow
any rule which would preclude it, in any case involv-
ing a station of a particular class, from granting or
renewing a license for a shorter period than that pre-
scribed for stations of such class if, in its judgment,
public interest, convenience, or necessity would be
served by such action.
SECTION 309
Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC and Section 309
(a) If upon examination of any application for a sta-
tion license or for the renewal or modification of a
station license the Commission shall determine that
public interest, convenience, or necessity would be
served by the granting thereof, it shall authorize the
issuance, renewal, or modification thereof in accor-
dance with said finding. In the event the Commission
upon examination of any such application does not
reach such decision with respect thereto, it shall no-
tify the applicant thereof, shall fix and give notice of
a time and place for hearing thereon, and shall af-
ford such applicant an opportunity to be heard
under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe.
Section 309 Post-Ashbacker and Prior to the Com-
munications Act Amendments of 1960
(a) If upon examination of any application [for a
station license or for the renewal or modification of a
station license] provided for in section 308 the Com-
mission shall [determine] find that public interest,
convenience, [and] necessity would be served by the
granting thereof, it shall [authorize the issuance, re-
newal, or modification thereof in accordance with
said finding. In the event the Commission upon ex-
amination of any such application does not reach
such decision with respect thereto, it shall notify the
applicant and shall afford such applicant an oppor-
tunity to be heard under such rules and regulations
as it may prescribe] grant such application.
(c) When any instrument of authorization is granted
by the Commission without a hearing as provided in
subsection (a) hereof, such grant shall remain subject
to protest as hereinafter provided for a period of
thirty days. During such thirty-day period any party
in interest may file a protest under oath directed to
such grant and request a hearing on said application
so granted. Any protest so filed shall be served on the
grantee, shall contain such allegations of fact as will
show the protestant to be a party in interest, and
shall specify with particularity the facts relied upon
by the protestant as showing that the grant was im-
properly made or would otherwise not be in the pub-
lic interest. The Commission shall, within thirty
days of the filing of the protest, render a decision
making findings as to the sufficiency of the protest in
meeting the above requirements; and, where it so
finds, shall designate the application for hearing
upon issues relating to all matters specified in the
protest as grounds for setting aside the grant, except
with respect to such matters as to which the Com-
mission, after affording protestant an opportunity for
oral argument, finds, for reasons set forth in the de-
cision, that, even if the facts alleged were to be
proven, no grounds for setting aside the grant are
presented. The Commission may in such decision re-
draft the issues urged by the protestant in accordance
with the facts or substantive matters alleged in the
protest, and may also specify in such decision that
the application be set for hearing upon such further
issues as it may prescribe, as well as whether it is
adopting as its own any of the issues resulting from
the matters specified in the protest. In any hearing
subsequently held upon such application issues spec-
ified by the Commission upon its own initiative or
adopted by it shall be tried in the same manner pro-
vided in subsection (b) hereof, but with respect to
issues resulting from facts set forth in the protest and
[Vol. I
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not adopted or specified by the Commission, on its
own motion, both the burden of proceeding with the
introduction of evidence and the burden of proof
shall be upon the protestant. The hearing and deter-
mination of cases arising under this subsection shall
be expedited by the Commission and pending hear-
ing and decision the effective date of the Commis-
sion's action to which protest is made shall be post-
poned to the effective date of the Commission's
decision after hearing, unless the authorization in-
volved is necessary to the maintenance or conduct of
an existing service, or unless the Commission affirm-
atively finds for reasons set forth in the decision that
the public interest requires that the grant remain in
effect, in which event the Commission shall author-
ize the applicant to utilize the facilities or authoriza-
tion in question pending the Commission's decision
after hearing.
Section 309 After the Communications Act Amend-
ments of 1960
(a) Subject to the provisions of this section, [If upon
examination of any application provided for in sec-
tion 308,1 the Commission shall [find] determine, in
the case of each application filed with it to which
section 308 applies, whether the public interest, con-
venience, and necessity will be served by the granting
of such application, and, if the Commission, upon
examination of such application and upon considera-
tion of such other matters as the Commission may
officially notice, shall find that public interest, conve-
nience, and [or] necessity would be served by the
granting thereof, it shall grant such application.
(c) revised and renumbered as (d) and (e)
(d) (1) Any party in interest may file with the Com-
mission a petition to deny any application (whether
as originally filed or as amended) to which subsec-
tion (b) of this section applies at any time prior to
the day of Commission grant thereof without hearing
or the day of formal designation thereof for hearing;
except that with respect to any classification of appli-
cations, the Commission from time to time by rule
may specify a shorter period (no less than thirty days
following the issuance of public notice by the Com-
mission of the acceptance for filing of such applica-
tion or of any substantial amendment thereof), which
shorter period shall be reasonably related to the time
when the applications would normally be reached
for processing. The petitioner shall serve a copy of
such petition on the applicant. The petition shall
contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show
that the petitioner is a party in interest and that a
grant of the application would be prima facie incon-
sistent with subsection (a). Such allegations of fact
shall, except for those of which official notice may be
taken, be supported by affidavit of a person or per-
sons with personal knowledge thereof. The applicant
shall be given the opportunity to file a reply in
which allegations of fact or denials thereof shall sim-
ilarly be supported by affidavit.
(2) If the Commission finds on the basis of the
application, the pleadings filed, or other matters to
which it may officially notice that there are no sub-
stantial and material questions of fact and that a
grant of the application would be consistent with
subsection (a), it shall make the grant, deny the peti-
tion, and issue a concise statement of the reasons for
denying the petition, which statement shall dispose
of all substantial issues raised by the petition. If a
substantial and material question of fact is presented
or if the Commission for any reason is unable to find
that grant of the application would be consistent
with subsection (a), it shall proceed as provided in
subsection (e).
(e) If, in the case of any application to which subsec-
tion (a) of this section applies, a substantial and ma-
terial question of fact is presented or the Commis-
sion for any reason is unable to make the finding
specified in such subsection, it shall formally desig-
nate the application for hearing on the ground or
reasons then obtaining and shall forthwith notify the
applicant and all other known parties in interest of
such action and the grounds and reasons therefor,
specifying with particularity the matters and things
in issue but not including issues or requirements
phrased generally. When the Commission has so
designated an application for hearing, the parties in
interest, if any, who are not notified by the Commis-
sion of such action may acquire the status of a party
to the proceeding thereon by filing a petition for in-
tervention showing the basis for their interest at any
time not less than ten days prior to the date of hear-
ing. Any hearing subsequently held upon such appli-
cation shall be a full hearing in which the applicant
and all other parties in interest shall be permitted to
participate. The burden of proceeding with the in-
troduction of evidence and the burden of proof shall
be upon the applicant, except that with respect to
any issue presented by a petition to deny or a peti-
tion to enlarge the issues, such burdens shall be as
determined by the Commission.
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Section 309 Prior to the Communications Amend-
ments Act of 1982
(a) same
(d) same
(e) If, in the case of any application to which subsec-
tion (a) of this section applies, a substantial and ma-
terial question of fact is presented or the Commis-
sion for any reason is unable to make the finding
specified in such subsection, it shall formally desig-
nate the application for hearing on the ground or
reasons then obtaining and shall forthwith notify the
applicant and all other known parties in interest of
such action and the grounds and reasons therefor,
specifying with particularity the matters and things
in issue but not including issues or requirements
phrased generally. When the Commission has so
designated an application for hearing, the parties in
interest, if any, who are not notified by the Commis-
sion of such action may acquire the status of a party
to the proceeding thereon by filing a petition for in-
tervention showing the basis for their interest [at any
time not less than ten days prior to the date of hear-
ing] not more than thirty days after publication of
the hearing issues or any substantial amendment
thereto in the Federal Register. Any hearing subse-
quently held upon such application shall be a full
hearing in which the applicant and all other parties
in interest shall be permitted to participate. The
burden of proceeding with the introduction of evi-
dence and the burden of proof shall be upon the ap-
plicant, except that with respect to any issue
presented by a petition to deny or a petition to en-
large the issues, such burdens shall be determined by
the Commission.
(i)(1) If there is more than one applicant for any ini-
tial license or construction permit which will involve
any use of the electromagnetic spectrum, then the
Commission, after determining the qualifications of
each such applicant under section 308(b), shall have
authority to grant such license or permit to a quali-
fied applicant through the use of a system of random
selection.
(2) The determination of the Commission under
paragraph (1) with respect to the qualifications of
applicants for an initial license or construction per-
mit shall be made after notice an opportunity for a
hearing, except that the provisions of section
409(c)(2) shall not apply in the case of any such
determination.





(i)(1) If there is more than one application for any
initial license or construction permit which will in-
volve any use of the electromagnetic spectrum, then
the Commission, after determining [the qualifications
of each such applicant under section 308(b)] that
each such application is acceptable for filing, shall
have authority to grant such license or permit to a
qualified applicant through the use of a system of
random selection.
(2) [The determination of the Commission under
paragraph (1) with respect to the qualifications of
applicants for an initial license or construction per-
mit shall be made after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, except that the provisions of section
409(c)(2) shall not apply in the case of any such de-
termination.] No license or construction permit shall
be granted to an applicant selected pursuant to para-
graph (1) unless the Commission determines the
qualifications of such applicant pursuant to subsec-
tion (a) and section 308(b). When substantial and
material questions of fact exist concerning such qual-
ifications, the Commission shall conduct a hearing in
order to make such determinations. For the purpose
of making such determinations, the Commission
may, by rule, and notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law-
(A) adopt procedures for the submission of all
or part of the evidence in written form;
(B) delegate the function of presiding at the tak-
ing of written evidence to Commission employ-
ees other than administrative law judges; and
(C) omit the determination required by subsec-
tion (a) with respect to any application other
than the one selected pursuant to paragraph (I).
REMAINDER OF SUBSECTION (i)
OMITTED
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